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Resumen 
La homogenización del apoyo electoral a los partidos políticos, 
también llamada nacionalización de los partidos políticos, es un 
factor clave en los sistemas democráticos. En este documento se 
examina el impacto del contexto y variables intra-partidarias en la 
explicación de los patrones de nacionalización partidaria en América 
Latina. En las décadas de 1980 y 1990, varios países en la región 
experimentaron transiciones a la democracia. A pesar de existen 
similitudes en estos procesos, el proceso de democratización 
seguido por el país y la prevalencia de conflictos políticos son dos 
factores que restringen la nacionalización de los partidos. 
Concretamente, entre mas fragmentado sea el sistema de partidos 
políticos y a mayor diversidad en la composición demográfica del 
país, menos nacionalizados son los partidos políticos. Estos 
resultados son robustos estadísticamente incluso cuando se controla 
por otros factores temporales y contextuales.         
Palabras clave: partidos políticos, elecciones, nacionalización de los 
partidos políticos, fragmentación política  
Abstract 
Increasing the homogeneity of a party’s support across the nation -
party nationalization- is a key concern to democracies. This paper 
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tests the impact of country and intra-party variables in explaining 
party nationalization changes in Latin America. During the early 
1980s and 1990s, several Latin American countries experienced 
transitions to democracy. Although there are similarities in this 
process, both the democratization pattern followed by the country 
and the prevalence of civil conflict decrease the nationalization of 
parties. In addition, the more fragmented the political party system 
and the more diverse the ethnic composition of the country the less 
nationalized the political parties. These results are robust even when 
controlling for time and other contextual effects.     
Keywords: political parties, elections, party nationalization, 
democratization patterns, political fragmentation. 
 
Introduction  
Party nationalization has 
implications in democracies. It 
affects partisan behavior, 
government priorities, and 
democratic consolidationi. When 
political party’s electoral returns 
are homogeneous across the 
country these parties are 
considered nationalized, 
otherwise party’s support is 
much more localized or 
regionalized. In terms of its 
implications, nationalized 
parties are more capable of 
aggregating social demands and 
implementing a broad spectrum 
of policies whereas local parties 
are prisoners of parochial 
initiatives for attracting voters.  
But what factors modify 
significantly political parties’ 
geographical electoral support 
patterns in the long term? 
According to scholars only 
major social changes such as 
post-industrialization, civil war, 
depression, or massive 
population shifts, alter political 
party’s patterns considerably1. I 
argue that there are other two 
main factors to take into 
account for explaining party 
nationalization in Latin America. 
Using time series cross sectional 
analysis, this paper examines 
the impact of civil conflicts and 
democratization patterns in 
explaining party nationalization 
changes in Latin America over 
the last sixty years (1950-
2010). An important focus of 
the paper is to distinguish 
among factors that explain 
differences between parties, 
among countries, and across 
elections and time. I address 
the following main questions: 
Do democratization patterns 
and civil conflicts influence 
party nationalization? If so, how 
do they work? Specifically, I 
study the following questions:  
To what extent democratization 
trends and political instability in 
                                       
1
 Chhibber, P. and K. Kollman, "Party 
Aggregation and the Number of Parties in 
India and the United States", The American 
Political Science Review 92(2) (1998): 329-
342. 
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Latin America have modified 
considerably political parties’ 
support patterns in the 
territory? Are there noticeable 
differences in party 
nationalization depending on 
democratization patterns and 
political instability?  
In this research paper I 
argue that besides country 
factors, civil conflicts and 
democratization patterns 
contribute to understand party 
nationalization levels in Latin 
America. Concretely, I expect 
that the level of party 
nationalization decreases in 
context where civil conflicts 
have prevailed as a result of the 
political polarization during 
conflicts. Additionally, in those 
countries where democratization 
has been a back and forth 
process between 
authoritarianism and 
democracy, the distribution of 
parties’ electoral support is less 
homogeneous across districts as 
well.        
Latin America is a good 
laboratory to study the effect of 
civil conflict on party 
nationalization because at 
several times countries in the 
region were involved in cruel 
internal conflicts. In spite of 
political instability and 
regardless of significant 
democratic progress over the 
last two decades in the region, 
the effects of both factors have 
been ignored in most of the 
literature. This 
oversimplification has ignored 
two key elements. First, the 
impact of civil conflicts in 
politics in the long run and 
second, the fact that 
democratization pathways 
varies remarkably by country. I 
claim that political instability 
and democratization pattern 
have negative effects on party 
nationalization scores. In 
striking contrast to most of the 
previous research on Latin 
American political parties’ 
performance, this paper seeks 
to overcome these limitations.   
I examine the factors 
that determine the extent to 
what political parties in Latin 
America get more electoral 
support in some districts than 
others. The empirical data in 
this paper include exhaustive 
and systematic comparisons of 
party nationalization level 
across the entire region. Data 
show interesting inter- and 
intra-country differences in 
terms of geographic distribution 
of the parties’ vote.  
This paper assumes that 
party nationalization is a 
prominent issue because the 
way in which democracy is 
shaped in the region depends 
on the nature of the political 
system of each country. 
Examining party nationalization 
scores is a salient issue for 
several key reasons. Firstly, 
fluctuations in the partisan 
distribution of the vote affect 
partisan behavior and 
government priorities. 
According to Aleman and 
Kellam, elections that are 
decided on local issues tend to 
make congressional parties a 
composite of different parochial 
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interest, and make harder the 
task of forming a legislative 
majority behind policy proposals 
that have a national scope. 
Nationalized electorates, in 
contrast, can strength partisan 
ties despite electoral rules that 
emphasize personal 
characteristics (the personal 
vote) or decentralized candidate 
nomination procedures2. 
Likewise, others suggest that 
under nationalized party 
system, public policy is more 
likely to be oriented toward the 
national common good3. 
Conversely, elections that are 
decided on local issues require 
that the parties be flexible 
enough to adapt their programs 
to local realities.4 
Secondly, scholars argue 
that the nationalization of 
parties has a direct effect on the 
success of democratic 
consolidation and preserving 
democracy in countries with 
deep ethnic or national 
cleavages5. Thirdly, identifying 
                                       
2
 Aleman, E. and M. Kellam. "The 
nationalization of electoral change in the 
Americas." Electoral Studies 27(2) (2008): 
193-212. 
3
 Harbers, I. "Decentralization and the 
Development of Nationalized Party Systems 
in New Democracies: Evidence From Latin 
America." Comparative Political Studies 
(2010). 
4
 Ishiyama, J. T. "Regionalism and the 
nationalization of the legislative vote in 
post-communist Russian politics." 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 
35(2) (2002): 155-168. 
5
Linz, J. J. and A. C. Stepan Problems of 
democratic transition and consolidation : 
southern Europe, South America, and post-
communist Europe. Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996. Jones, M. 
patterns of electoral change at 
the sub-national level can help 
scholars better understand 
national electoral volatility, 
electoral incentives, and 
executive strategies6. 
The structure of the 
document is as follows: the 
second section is dedicated to 
portrait the core characteristics 
of literature about party 
nationalization and my 
hypotheses for understanding 
electoral returns patterns in the 
region. Likewise, I provide 
methodological details about my 
data, unit of analysis, and 
model selection in the third 
section. Descriptive statistics 
and multivariate analysis results 
are fully depicted in the fourth 
section. Lastly, I present my 
conclusions.       
 
Literature on Party 
Nationalization 
  
Political parties are 
indispensable to the operation 
of democratic political systems. 
Chhibber and Kollman define a 
national party system as one in 
                                                
P. and S. Mainwaring. "The nationalization 
of parties and party systems - An empirical 
measure and an application to the 
Americas." Party Politics 9(2) (2003): 139-
166. Caramani, D. The nationalization of 
politics: the formation of national 
electorates and party systems in Western 
Europe. Cambridge, UK ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Meleshevich, A. "Geographical patterns of 
party support in the Baltic States, Russia, 
and Ukraine." European Urban and 
Regional Studies 13(2) (2006): 113-129. 
6
 Aleman, E. and M. Kellam. Op. Cit. 193-
212. 
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which party systems at the 
constituency level, or at the 
state level or provincial levels, 
look similar to national party 
systems7. This broad definition 
has encompassed two main 
concepts of nationalization: 
convergence in the level of 
partisan support across the 
nation, and uniform response of 
the different sub-units to 
political forces8. In sum, as 
Ishiyama affirms party 
nationalization reveals to extent 
to which party politics locally 
mirrors party politics 
nationally9. Consequently, party 
nationalization is high if party 
support is equally distributed 
across the territory of a 
country. Thus, a political party 
that is perfectly nationalized 
would be equally strong in all 
territorial units of a country, no 
matter how they are drawn10. 
 
A substantial body of 
literature has explored the 
different dimensions of civil 
conflicts. Some scholars 
investigate the causes of civil 
wars11, their severity12 as well 
as their definition and diverse 
                                       
7
 Chhibber, P. and K. Kollman,.Loc. Cit. 
329-342. 
8
 Aleman, E. and M. Kellam. Op. Cit. 193-
212. 
9
 Ishiyama, J. T. Op. Cit. 155-168. 
10
Bochsler, D. "Measuring party 
nationalisation: A new Gini-based indicator 
that corrects for the number of units." 
Electoral Studies 29(1) (2010): 155-168. 
11
 Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler. "Greed and 
grievance in civil war." Oxford Economic 
Papers 56(4) (2004): 563-595. 
12
 Lacina, B. "Explaining the Severity of 
Civil Wars." Journal of Conflict Resolution 
50(2) (2006): 276-289. 
manifestations13. Others focus 
on estimating the 
macroeconomic costs14, the 
health impacts in the society15, 
and the fiscal consequences 
associated with them16. Another 
issue that has been driven 
scholars’ attention is the 
duration an outcome of civil 
conflicts.17 
 
In contrast, here I 
examine the political impacts of 
civil conflicts on parties’ 
electoral support. Some 
scholars emphasize that the 
existence of political parties 
with uniform electoral support 
across geographical space is 
strongly linked to political 
                                       
13
 Sarkees, M. R., F. W. Wayman, et al. 
"Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State 
Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their 
Distribution over Time, 1816–1997." 
International Studies Quarterly 47(1) 
(2003): 49-70.Sambanis, N. "What Is Civil 
War? Conceptual and Empirical  
Complexities of an Operational Definition." 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(6) 
(2004): 814-858. 
14
 DiAddario, S. "Estimating the economic 
costs of conflict: An examination of the two-
gap estimation model for the case of 
Nicaragua." Oxford Agrarian Studies 25(1) 
(1997): 123 - 141. Lopez, H. and Q. Wodon. 
"The Economic Impact of Armed Conflict in 
Rwanda." Journal of African Economies 
14(4) (2005): 586-602. 
15
 Ghobarah, H., P. Huth, et al. "Civil Wars 
Kill and Maim People -Long After the 
Shooting Stops." American Political Science 
Review 97(02) (2003): 189-202. 
16
 Gupta, S., B. Clements, et al. "Fiscal 
consequences of armed conflict and 
terrorism in low- and middle-income 
countries." European Journal of Political 
Economy 20(2) (2004): 403-421.  
17
Fearon, J. D. "Why Do Some Civil Wars 
Last So Much Longer than Others?". 
Journal of Peace Research 41(3) (2004): 
275-301. 
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conflicts. Social or political 
cleavages are habitually the 
main source of party affiliation 
or party identification in 
societies18. These studies 
explain the party system as a 
mirror of organized social 
groups and social conflicts19. 
Caramani affirms that political 
cleavages characterize the 
divisions and oppositions within 
the space of political systems20. 
As a result, cleavages provide 
the bases of support for parties 
and structuring the party 
competition.21 
Based on the fact that 
this approach is by far the most 
prominent in comparative 
politics this paper relies on that 
                                       
18
 Lukáš, L. and P. Lyons. “Is the 
Nationalisation of Politics Fact or Artefact?. 
Evidence from the Czech Republic”. Paper 
proposal for the workshop: "The 
Nationalization of Party Systems in Central 
and Eastern Europe". Rennes, France., 
Department of Political Science, University 
of Rannes, 2008. 
19
 Ishiyama, J. T. Op. Cit. 155-168. 
Bochsler, D. and S. Gherghina. "The 
Shakedown of the Urban-rural Division in 
Post-communist Romanian Party Politics. 
An analysis of territorial patterns of party 
support in Romania". Paper proposal for the 
workshop: "The Nationalization of Party 
Systems in Central and Eastern Europe". 
Rennes, France, Department of Political 
Science, University of Rannes, 2008. 
20
 Caramani, D. Op. Cit. 
21
 Ockey, J. "Variations on a Theme: 
Societal Cleavages and Party Orientations 
Through Multiple Transitions in Thailand." 
Party Politics 11(6) (2005): 728-747. Saarts, 
T. “Nationalisation of Party Systems in the 
Baltic States and in Central Europe: A 
Comparative Perspective”. Paper proposal 
for workshop: “The Nationalization of Party 
Systems in Central and Eastern Europe”. 
Rennes, France, Department of Political 
Science, University of Rannes, 2008. 
framework. It highlights the 
nature of social cleavages that 
manifest themselves in party 
politics. Moreover, the literature 
on party systems in several 
countries is predominantly 
rooted in this tradition22. In 
those countries where civil 
conflicts have been prevalent, 
parties’ electoral support 
depends on post-conflict effects, 
particularly on emergent 
territorial cleavages. 
Theoretically, under armed 
conflict contexts political parties 
are considerably less 
nationalized. In short, I 
hypothesized that civil conflicts 
alter significantly patterns of 
parties’ support; specifically I 
determine the extent to what 
party nationalization scores 
decrease as a post conflict 
consequence.  
In addition to the 
influence that civil conflicts 
could have on party 
nationalization, I explore the 
effects of democratization 
patterns as another alternative 
explanation for changes in the 
geographical distribution of 
parties’ votes. My assumption 
relies on the idea that the ways 
in which countries democratize 
matter in terms of having 
nationalized parties. Speaking 
of the third wave of 
democratization process, 
Samuel Huntington says that 
each of the first two waves was 
                                       
22
 Chhibber, P. K. and K. Kollman. The 
formation of national party systems : 
federalism and party competition in Canada, 
Great Britain, India, and the United States. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2004. 
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followed by a reverse wave in 
which some but not all of the 
new democracies reverted to 
authoritarianism23. Many Latin 
American countries perfectly 
illustrate this regime transition 
pattern named “bouncers” or 
“cyclers” meaning this back and 
forth process from 
authoritarianism to 
democracy24. Munck and Leff 
argue that the process of 
transition from authoritarian 
rule, independently of the 
conditions that generated it, 
helps determine not only the 
prospects of democratic 
consolidation but also the 
success of the transition to 
democracy in the first place. 
They also argue that different 
modes of transition are likely to 
have distinct consequences for 
a country's politics25. Other 
observers claim that a country’s 
previous transition history may 
affect later democratization 
efforts26. Consequently, one 
might expect that in “bouncers” 
countries less nationalized 
parties predominate.   
Furthermore, other 
scholars have been trying to 
explain party nationalization 
using a set of intra-party 
variables, principally among 
                                       
23
 Huntington, S. P. (1996). Democracy for 
the Long Haul, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
24
 Goldstein and Kocornik-Mina, 2005. 
25
 Munck, G. L. and C. S. Leff. "Modes of 
Transition and Democratization: South 
America and Eastern Europe in Comparative 
Perspective." Comparative Politics 29(3) 
(1997): 343-362. 
26
 Epstein, D. L., R. Bates, et al. 
"Democratic Transitions." American Journal 
of Political Science 50(3) (2006): 551-569. 
them party age or ideology. The 
assumption of the former is 
simple. According to Caramani 
party nationalization derives 
from historical evolution27. 
Indeed, Morgenstern et al. 
suggests that more mature 
democracies should have higher 
nationalization scores28. If this 
assumption is accurate, the 
older the party the more 
nationalized, whereas the 
youngest parties are just trying 
to forge their electoral support. 
As a result, party age affects 
positively party nationalization. 
Therefore, as party age 
augments party nationalization 
should increase.     
Also, political parties are 
crucial in democratic regimes 
not only because they are the 
only way to reach political 
power, but also because they 
reflect social differences. 
Generally speaking, parties with 
the same ideology tend to adopt 
equal positions to similar issues. 
However, how political parties 
embody social conflicts differs 
by party. It depends on many 
aspects, principally among them 
Party ideology. Thus, right or 
left parties tend to propose 
different solutions to the same 
problems. Based on the fact 
that, left or center-left parties 
are capable of forming alliances 
with a broader social groups, 
these parties tend to get more 
homogenous electoral support 
across territory. As a result, 
                                       
27
 Caramani, D. Op Cit. 
28
 Morgenstern, S., S. M. Swindle, et al. 
"Party Nationalization and Institutions." 
Journal of Politics 71(4) (2009): 1322-1341.  
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centrist parties could be more 
appealing to some geographical 
districts than others. At the 
same time, parties identified 
with a more ideologically 
extreme position could have a 
regional geographic base, 
especially if their appeal is more 
closely aligned with particular 
social groups29. If party ideology 
is associated with party 
nationalization, ideological 
extreme political parties get 
lower scores of party 
nationalization than centrist 
parties.  
In addition, political 
fragmentation is often 
associated with party 
nationalization. In particularly, 
under fragmented political 
contexts is much more difficult 
for parties to attract votes, 
because there are more 
competitors in the political 
arena. Also, fragmentation 
complicates coalition building in 
the legislature and inhibits 
compromise on policy issues30. 
Additionally, Mainwaring argues 
that the combination of 
presidentialism and 
multipartism makes stable 
democracy difficult to sustain. 
So, this combination is more 
likely to produce immobilizing 
executive/legislative deadlock31.  
                                       
29
 Loc. Cit. 
30
 Laakso, M. and R. Taagepera. "Effective 
Number of Parties: A Measure with 
Application to West Europe." Comparative 
Political Studies 12(1) (1979): 3-27. 
Mainwaring 1993; Birnir and Cott 2007). 
31
 Mainwaring, S. "Presidentialism, 
Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult 
Combination." Comparative Political 
Studies 26(2) (1993): 198-228. 
Similarly, previous 
research has shown the 
influence of ethnic differences 
on party’s electoral patterns32. 
This approach is based on the 
assumption that ethnic diversity 
leads to regional heterogeneity 
of the party system33. According 
to Morgenstern, Swindle et al., 
this argument rests on the idea 
that ethnic groups are 
geographically concentrated and 
have interests distinct from 
other sectors of the society34. 
Furthermore, the greater the 
extent to which the population 
of a state is composed of a 
plurality of national, linguistic, 
religious, or cultural societies, 
the more complex politics 
becomes, since an agreement 
on the fundamentals of a 
democracy will be more 
difficult35. The political 
implications of ethnic cleavages 
are particularly important in 
newly democratic countries, 
where social structure may have 
a larger impact than institutions 
in shaping political life. Briefly, 
in general, the greater the 
social diversity, the greater the 
fragmentation of parties in the 
legislature since parties will 
appeal to and represent distinct 
social cleavages36. So, if ethnic 
                                       
32
 Boschler 2006. Harbers, I. 
"Decentralization and the Development of 
Nationalized Party Systems in New 
Democracies: Evidence From Latin 
America." Comparative Political Studies 
(2010). 
33
 Boschler 2006 
34
 Morgenstern, S., S. M. Swindle, et al. Op. 
Cit. 1322-1341.  
35
 Linz, J. J. and A. C. Stepan . Op. Cit. 
36
 Birnir, J. and D. L. V. Cott. "Disunity in 
Diversity: Party System Fragmentation and 
M.Sc. Ronald Alfaro-Redondo 
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fractionalization is significant, 
party nationalization should 
tend to decline.  
Methodology and data 
The purpose of the 
present research is to determine 
the effect of democratization 
patterns and political instability 
on party nationalization in Latin 
American nations using 
Legislative elections. Countries 
are included in this study based 
on two criteria: 1) availability of 
electoral data for measuring 
party nationalization by 
districts, and 2) a reasonable 
number of free and fair 
elections since democratization. 
The database includes time-
series cross section 
comparisons of 15 countries 
with data collected on 46 
political parties, 104 elections, 
and 326 electoral districts. The 
unit of analysis is the political 
party. Table 1 summarizes the 
main characteristics of study 
cases, and it also provides a fair 
picture of the region as a whole 
in terms of some electoral 
systems components.   
The data combine 
electoral results by districts 
using official sources such as 
Electoral Courts in each 
country, and political instability 
data compiled in specialized 
datasets like COW Intra-State 
War Data and Political Survival 
Data. Also, I include country, 
                                                
the Dynamic Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity 
on Latin American Legislatures." Latin 
American Research Review 42(1) (2007): 
99-125. 
intra-party predictors and 
control variables.  
Variables  
Dependent variable: 
Party nationalization, the 
dependent variable, refers to 
the homogeneity of a party’s 
support across the nation. To 
assess the dispersion of party 
strength across the territory I 
use the Party Nationalization 
Score (PNS), proposed by Jones 
and Mainwaring (2003).37 
Basically, PNS is based on the 
Gini coefficient, a well-known 
measure of income inequality. 
So, a Gini coefficient is 
computed that reflects the vote 
distribution of each party. A 
coefficient of 0 signifies that a 
party received the same 
percentage of votes in every 
sub-national unit and the value 
1 means perfectly unequal 
distribution (a party has exactly 
the same vote share across all 
territorial units). In a second 
step, the Gini coefficient is then 
subtracted from 1 so that high 
scores indicate a high level of 
party nationalization (PNS = 1 – 
Gini coefficient). 
Independent variables  
In this section I describe 
the operationalization of my set 
of independent variables.  
Conflict predictors 
Political conflict refers to the 
number of years in which there 
has been armed conflict in the 
                                       
37
 Jones, M. P. and S. Mainwaring. Op. Cit. 
139-166. 
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TABLE 1: SEATS, DISTRICTS, AND ELECTIONS INCLUDED (MOST 
RECENT ELECTION) 
Country Districts Seats Parties Elections Country Districts Seats Parties Elections 
Argentina 24 257 2 1991-05 Honduras 18 128 2 1981-09 
Bolivia 9 130 3 1985-05 Nicaragua 17 91 2 1990-06 
Brazil 27 513 3 1990-06 Panama 9 71 4 1994-09 
Chile 60 120 2 1989-09 Paraguay 18 80 2 1993-08 
Colombia 33 164 2 1974-10 Peru 25 120 4 2001-06 
Costa Rica 7 57 6 1953-10 Venezuela 24 167 3 1968-05 
El 
Salvador 14 84 3 1994-09 Uruguay 19 99 3 1950-09 
Guatemala 22 158 4 1995-07 Total 326 2,239 46 104 
Source: research dataset by the author. 
country for 1946-2008. The 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset version 4-2009 is the 
source of information. This 
dataset defines conflict as: “a 
contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of 
armed force between two 
parties, of which at least one is 
the government of a state, 
results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths”. I use an ordinal 
variable with four categories. 
The description of the 
categories is as follows: 0= 0 
years of conflict, 1=less than 10 
years with armed conflict, 
2=among 10 and 20 years with 
conflict, and 3=more than 20 
years of internal armed conflict.  
Coups d’état considers 
the number of successful coups 
in the country from 1946 to 
2009. I employ the Coups 
d’états events codebook by the 
Center of Systemic Peace 
(version July 30, 2010). For 
purposes of that compilation, a 
coup d’état is defined as a 
forceful seizure of executive 
authority and office by a 
dissident/opposition faction 
within the country’s ruling or 
political elites that results in a 
substantial change in the 
executive leadership and the 
policies of the prior regime 
(although not necessarily in the 
nature of regime authority or 
mode of governance). This is an 
ordinal four scale variable that 
includes the following 
categories: 0= 0 successful 
coups, 1=less than 5 successful 
coups, 2=5 successful coups, 
and 3=more than 5 coups. 
Democratization pattern 
variables 
 Third wave is a dummy 
variable in which countries that 
democratized in the third wave 
of democratization are coded as 
1 and 0 otherwise. 
 Regime change is related 
to the history of regime changes 
in the countries that 
democratize according to 
Samuel Huntington. For the 
purpose of this paper I utilize a 
five-point scale predictor with 
the following categories: 0= 
democratic regime; 1=direct 
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transition (from a stable 
authoritarian system to a stable 
democratic system, either 
through gradual evolution over 
time or the abrupt replacement 
of the former by the latter; 2= 
second-try (a country with an 
authoritarian system shifts to a 
democratic one, later the 
democratic system fails and an 
authoritarian government then 
comes to power for a greater or 
shorter period of time. 
Eventually, however, a second 
and more successful effort is 
made to introduce democracy); 
3=interrupted democracy (this 
involves countries that develop 
democratic regimes that exists 
for a relatively sustained period 
of time. At some point, 
however, instability, 
polarization, or other conditions 
develop and lead to the 
suspension of democratic 
processes); 4=cyclical pattern 
(countries alternated back and 
forth between democratic and 
authoritarian systems. This 
pattern was particularly 
prevalent in Latin America).  
 Years since transition, 
denotes the number of years 
since the last transition to 
democracy. The data come from 
Polity IV 2010 database.  
 Democratization 
processes, is associated with 
the country’s pattern of 
democratization using 
Huntington criteria. I employ a 
five-point scale with the 
following categories: 0= 
democracy; 1=transplacement 
(democratization is produced by 
the combined actions of 
government and opposition); 
2=transformation (those in 
power in the authoritarian 
regime take the lead and play a 
decisive role in ending that 
regime and changing it into a 
democratic system); 
3=replacement 
(democratization results from 
the opposition gaining strength 
and the government losing 
strength until the latter 
collapses or is overthrown); 
4=intervention (there is a 
foreign government intervention 
for democratizing the country). 
Political party predictors 
Party age refers to the 
date when political parties were 
founded. I use the number of 
years each political party has 
been competing politically. 
Because I theorize that party 
nationalization derives from 
historical evolution I expect that 
the older the party is, the more 
nationalized. Despite party age 
does not necessarily reflect 
party stability, nevertheless it 
assess whether political parties 
get more nationalized as they 
age. Data for this indicator are 
available in Latin American 
Political Parties38. Where 
necessary, data were updated 
and cross-checked with 
information available from 
political parties’ official 
websites.        
Party ideology, according 
to the literature political parties 
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, M., and F. Freidenberg. 
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Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 
2001. 
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reflect social differences39, 
however, how political parties 
embody social conflicts differs 
by party. It depends on factors 
like party ideology. I coded 
each political party ideology 
using a five point scale that 
ranges from 0 = “Left”, 
1=”Center-Left”, 2=”Center”, 
3=”Center-Right”, and 
4=Right”. 
Country variables   
Political fragmentation, in 
fragmented party systems, 
small parties divide most of the 
vote, hence a powerful 
tendency towards low 
nationalization40. Here, I use 
the Effective Number of Parties 
Index (ENPI) devised by Laakso 
and Taagepera to measure 
political fragmentation. The 
ENPI is calculated by squaring 
the proportion of the vote or 
seat shares of each party, 
adding these together, then 
dividing 1 by this total. The 
higher the ENPI value, the more 
fragmented the political 
system41. 
Ethnic fractionalization. 
Scholars argument, in short, 
that the regionalization of party 
systems among ethnic 
boundaries might reinforce 
ethnic identities and separation 
and deepen the cleavages 
                                       
39
 Moon, W. "Decomposition of Regional 
Voting in South Korea: Ideological Conflicts 
and Regional Interests." Party Politics 11(5) 
(2005): 579-599. 
40
 Jones, M. P. and S. Mainwaring. Op. Cit. 
139-166. 
41
 Laakso, M. and R. Taagepera. Op. Cit. 3-
27. 
further42. Under multicultural 
context it is quite reasonable to 
hypothesize that ethnic diversity 
have a significant effect in the 
way in which parties’ votes are 
distributed across the country. 
In other words, in countries 
characterized for having a 
multi-ethnic composition party 
nationalization is determined by 
ethnic differences. In those 
territories, it is much more 
difficult to find nationalized 
parties because inter-ethnic 
differences predominate. To 
measure the impact of ethnic 
heterogeneity I use Alesina et 
al. Index43. Using this variable I 
want to capture inter-country 
differences in the region.  
Control variables  
 Country Area accounts for 
the fact that countries differ 
considerably in terms of their 
geographical territory. This 
variable considers the number 
of squared kilometers. I 
transform the variable using the 
log of the original value. Data 
come from United Nations 
official documents.  
 Federalism is a dummy 
variable with Federal countries 
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.  
 GDP per capita in USD for 
the years included in the 
dataset. I use official data 
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 Bochsler, D. "Measuring party 
nationalisation: A new Gini-based indicator 
that corrects for the number of units." 
Electoral Studies 29(1) (2010): 155-168. 
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 Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, et al., 
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published by the Economic Latin 
American Commission (ECLAC).  
 Elections refers to the 
number of parliamentary 
elections.  
 Dummies for specific 
years account for the fact that 
party nationalization have 
evolved as years passed by. The 
following events were 
considered for creating the 
dummies: 1994 and 
1999=economic crisis in Mexico 
and Argentina; 
2004=commemorates 15 years 
after the referendum for 
democratization in Chile; and 
2009= international crisis.     
My model is as follows:   
Party nationalization 
score (PNS) = β0 + β1 Conflict + 
β2 Coups d’état + β3 Third wave  
+ β4 Regime change + β5 
Democratic pattern + β6 Party 
age + β7 Political fragmentation 
+ β8 Transition + β9 Ethnic 
fragmentation + β10 Party 
ideology + β11 lnCountry area + 
β12 Federal + β13 GDP per capita 
+ β14 Dummies years + ε 
Empirical Results  
Table 2 depicts the main 
descriptive statistics of the 
variables included in the 
models. According to these 
results, there are remarkable 
differences among cases in 
party nationalization. The 
average of party nationalization 
in the region is 0.83. Using 
Jones and Mainwaring 
classification, this value is 
associated with an intermediate 
score of party nationalization. 
 
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES    
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Party nationalization 0.83 0.13 0.27 0.98 
Conflict 8.81 13.92 0 46 
Coups d’état 2.49 2.64 0 7 
Third wave (dummy) 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Regime change 2.08 1.41 0 4 
Party age 53.38 51.06 0 173 
Political 
fragmentation 
3.56 1.62 1.1 9.3 
Transition 17.18 15.35 0 62 
Ethnic fragmentation   0.38 0.18 0.17 0.74 
GDP per capita 3,341.69 1,921.39 681 8,181 
Ideology 2.24 1.30 0 4 
Country area (km2) 1,053,262 2,003,476 21,141 8,514,877 
Federal (dummy) 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Democratic processes 1.39 1.19 0 4 
Country area (log) 12.59 1.64 9.96 15.96 
GDP per capita (log) 7.93 0.63 6.52 9.01 
Source: research dataset by the author.  
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Additionally, the dependent 
variable values range from 0.27 
(COPEI, Venezuela in 2005) to 
0.98 (five political parties in 
Costa Rica and one in 
Honduras).   Some trends in 
party nationalization can be 
easily observable in Latin 
America. Overall the results 
provide good evidence of both 
national and local forces at work 
on the electorate. Speaking of 
inter-country differences, 
political parties in Honduras, 
Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica 
(in a lesser extent) look highly 
nationalized across the region. 
Conversely, Venezuelan 
(especially in the last decade), 
Peruvian, and Bolivian parties’ 
electoral support show the 
greatest differences among 
departments. In the middle of 
the nationalization scale, there 
are cases such as Brazilian, 
Salvadorian and Argentinean 
parties. Interestingly, there are 
different patterns in the region 
in terms of the distribution of 
parties’ support patterns. In 
some countries there are no 
significant changes over time 
(Honduras and Chile) whereas 
in others there occurs radical 
changes (Colombia and 
Venezuela). Likewise, in terms 
of intra-country differences 
(figure 2), there are at least 
four sub-sets of countries. In 
Chile, Honduras, and Nicaragua 
there are significantly less 
dissimilarities in electoral 
support patterns among political 
parties than in the rest of the 
region, whereas in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala and Uruguay one 
can consider the differences in 
party nationalization scores 
between parties as modest. In 
striking contrast, in El Salvador, 
Panama, and Paraguay parties’ 
scores show higher disparities. 
Finally, the most dramatic 
variations in parties’ electoral 
support patterns come from 
cases such as Colombia, Peru, 
and Venezuela.   
Within the lowest nationalized 
scores, seven out of the ten 
belong to three countries 
Venezuela (COPEI and AD), 
Colombia and Peru. In the 
opposite extreme category, all 
ten parties that show the 
highest nationalization scores 
are from three Central American 
countries: El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Costa Rica. The 
National Liberation Party (PLN) 
and Social Christian Unity Party 
(PUSC) in Costa Rica are the 
two political parties that have 
been predominantly 
nationalized. These two parties 
are followed by Nationalist 
Republic Alliance Party (ARENA, 
El Salvador), and both 
Honduras’s parties: Honduran 
Liberal Party and The National 
Party (PLH and PNH, 
respectively).    
Multivariate analysis 
For assessing the effect of 
conflict and democratization 
predictors on party 
nationalization I employ 
Generalized Least Squares with 
Random Effects (GLSRE). Based 
on the fact that I have repeated 
observations per political party 
and thus my observations are 
not independent from each 
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FIGURE 1: BOX PLOT PARTY NATIONALIZATION SCORE BY 
COUNTRY   
Source: research dataset by the author. 
other Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) methods are 
inappropriate because of the 
underestimation of standard 
errors and thus incorrect 
hypothesis tests. Since in my 
study the population error term 
(or residual) for one observation 
is related to the population 
error term of all other 
observations then it violates the 
no autocorrelation assumption 
of OLS.   Specifically, my cases 
are temporally near one another 
and may have error terms that 
are related as well. Instead I 
estimate the model using 
GLSRE. I assume that both the 
individual effects and the error 
term mean-zero processes, 
uncorrelated with the 
regressors; that they are each 
homoscedastic; that they are 
uncorrelated with each other; 
and that there is no correlation 
over individuals or time44. I 
employ several tests for 
heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. On one hand, 
for the latter, I apply the 
Arellano - Bond test for 
autocorrelation. This test has a 
null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and is applied to 
the differenced residuals. The 
test for AR (1) process in first 
differences usually rejects the 
null hypothesis as in my case. 
In other words, there is 
autocorrelation in my model. 
Also, I plot the residuals over 
time to detect autocorrelation.  
Table 3 reports the 
results of regressing party 
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nationalization on different sets 
of variables. Model 1 estimates 
multiple GLS regression with 
Random Effects without 
controlling for Country area in 
km2 and Federalism. Model 2 
includes social and political 
effects on the dependent 
variable plus intra-party and 
country predictors. Model 3 
TABLE 3: MODELS ESTIMATIONS RESULTS 
 
Source: research dataset by the author.  
 
incorporates the number of 
elections and dummy variables 
for several years in order to 
control for time effects. In 
general almost all of the 
independent predictors show a 
negative effect on the 
dependent variable but party 
age, GDP per capita, and 
Country area.  
All models provide 
support for the hypothesized 
negative effect of Armed 
+ p<.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
                                                                    
N                             254             254             254   
P>Chi-squared                0.00            0.00            0.00   
Wald Chi-squared            90.92          100.32           99.84   
R-squared overall          0.3697          0.4115          0.3927   
                                                                    
                           (0.05)          (0.28)          (0.05)   
Constant                     1.10***         0.76**          1.11***
                                                           (0.03)   
Year 2009                                                    0.04   
                                                           (0.04)   
Year 2004                                                   -0.01   
                                                           (0.03)   
Year 1999                                                    0.02   
                                                           (0.02)   
Year 1994                                                   -0.01   
                                                           (0.01)   
Elections                                                   -0.01   
                                           (0.07)                   
Federal                                     -0.18**                 
                                           (0.03)                   
Country area (log)                           0.03                   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
GDP per capita               0.00+           0.00***         0.00   
                           (0.08)          (0.10)          (0.08)   
Ethnic fractionali~n        -0.16+          -0.17+          -0.19*  
                           (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.01)   
Political fragment~n        -0.02***        -0.02**         -0.02***
                           (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.01)   
Party ideology              -0.01           -0.01           -0.01   
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
Party age                    0.00            0.00            0.00   
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)   
Democractic proces~s        -0.04+          -0.04*          -0.04*  
                           (0.00)          (0.00)          (0.00)   
Transition                  -0.00***        -0.00***        -0.00   
                           (0.01)          (0.02)          (0.01)   
Regime change               -0.04**         -0.06*          -0.04** 
                           (0.06)          (0.06)          (0.06)   
Third wave                   0.09            0.04            0.11+  
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)   
Coups d'etat                -0.01            0.02           -0.02   
                           (0.02)          (0.02)          (0.02)   
Armed conflicts             -0.03+          -0.04*          -0.03+  
                                                                    
                             b/se            b/se            b/se   
                           model1          model2          model3   
                                                                    
Party Nationalization Models
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conflicts, Regime change, 
political fragmentation, 
democratization pattern and 
ethnic fractionalization on party 
nationalization. GDP per capita 
is the only predictor that is 
positively associated with party 
nationalization that reaches 
statistical significance (in 
models 1 and 2). Furthermore, 
years since transition show the 
effect in the opposite direction 
and fail to reach statistical 
significance when controlling for 
time effects. Also, party age, 
coups, and third wave effects 
are in the right direction but 
they are not significant. 
Moreover, the R-squared 
accounts for 39% of the 
variance in the party 
nationalization (Y) in the model 
3 in comparison with 41% in 
model 2 and 37% in model 1. 
According to Model 3 
estimations, if everything is 
held constant, the effect of 
going from countries with no 
years with armed conflict and 
countries where there has been 
more than 20 years of conflict is 
associated with a decrease of 
0.12 units in the party 
nationalization score. In other 
words, the cumulative stock 
effect of civil conflict is 
noteworthy. Equally, Regime 
change is coded using a five 
points scale that varies from 0 
(Democracy) to 4 (Cyclical 
regime changes). As a result, 
the effect of going from 
democratic nations to “bouncy” 
countries is associated with a 
decrease of 0.20 units in the 
party nationalization score. 
Similarly, political fragmentation 
is coded using values that vary 
from 1.1 (one party system) to 
9.3 (highly fragmented). So, 
holding everything constant, the 
effect of moving from the lowest 
fragmentation value to the 
highest one is related to a 
decrease of 0.16 units in the 
dependent variable scale. 
Likewise, the effect of 
democratization pattern on the 
dependent variable is negative 
and significant, meaning that 
there is a difference of 0.25 
units in the party nationalization 
score among the parties that 
compete in democratic nations  
(using 1974 as the comparing 
point) and those that run in 
nations where democratization 
comes from foreign 
intervention.    
Moreover, one additional 
unit increase in the ethnic 
fractionalization index is related 
to a decrease of 0.19 units in 
the nationalization scale. Thus, 
the effect of moving from the 
lowest ethnic fractionalization 
(0.1689) to the
highest value (0.7396) is 
associated with a decrease of 
0.11 units in the score of the 
dependent variable. Also, the 
higher the GDP per capita the 
more nationalized parties even 
though the effect is not 
statistically significant. Finally, 
parties that run in Federal 
countries are less nationalized 
whereas Country area and time 
predictors show no effect on the 
dependent variable. This federal 
effect makes sense because 
these countries are bigger and 
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more diverse than non-federal 
nations.   
So far, Models 2 and 3 
yields substantively similar 
results meaning that the same 
variables are significant and the 
coefficients have pretty much 
the same magnitude and sign. 
If we compare the sub-sets of 
variables included in the model 
estimations, only one of the 
conflict predictors reach 
statistical significance, and 
three out of the four 
democratization variables are 
statistically significant; whereas 
in the set of the intra-party 
predictors any of the t-values 
exceeds the critical value. 
Lastly, both country predictors 
surpass the statistical 
significance threshold.   
According to the 
regression analysis, all models 
offer support for a negative 
effect of years since transition 
(but not significant in model 3) 
on party nationalization, and 
conversely a positive effect if 
the country democratizes in the 
third wave of democratization 
(only significant in model 3). 
Both cases are striking because 
one might expect that the more 
years since democratization the 
higher the nationalization of the 
parties and similarly a negative 
impact for late democratization. 
However, the data do not 
support these two assumptions.    
In addition, the test for 
the impact of Coups d’état, 
party age and party ideology 
failed to reveal statistically 
significant results. The last two 
outcomes contradict a well-
known body of literature. 
Firstly, as Caramani suggests 
parties nationalized when 
getting older45 but the data for 
Latin America support exactly 
the opposite. And secondly, the 
no effect party’s ideology is not 
consequent with recent 
literature  that suggest that 
parties identified with a more 
ideologically extreme position 
could have a locally focused 
base46. Thus, there are neither 
party’s age nor ideology effects 
on parties’ electoral support 
patterns.   
In sum, GLSRE 
estimations confirm the 
hypothesized negative effect of 
Armed conflicts, Regime 
change, democratization 
pattern, political fragmentation, 
and ethnic fractionalization on 
party nationalization. The 
estimations that I provide in 
this paper are robust even when 
controlling for GDP per capita, 
Federalism, Country size and 
time effects. These results 
reinforce the argument that 
party nationalization in Latin 
America depends upon the 
existence of armed conflict, 
what kind of regime change 
pattern the countries have 
followed and the socio-political 
fragmentation that exists in the 
society.   
Generally speaking, the 
literature on party 
nationalization in Latin America 
has taken for granted two 
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important factors. On one hand, 
the geographical distribution of 
parties’ electoral support is 
negatively impacted by armed 
conflicts. In Latin America civil 
conflicts have been prevalent 
and one might expect that 
political parties’ support 
patterns reflect these conflicts. 
On the other hand, regardless 
of the fact that most countries 
democratize relatively at the 
same time in the region, 
scholars have neglected that 
democratization has come in 
very different paths. 
Consequently, this study shows 
that the regime change pattern 
influences party nationalization.    
Conclusions  
 According to Jones and 
Mainwaring, the importance of 
analyzing variance in 
nationalization is greater for 
new democracies than for 
advanced industrial ones47. In 
this paper, I have offered a set 
of models that specifies the 
combination of country and 
party predictors for explaining 
the nationalization of political 
parties. The results showed that 
party nationalization in Latin 
America substantively reflects 
the influence of armed conflicts, 
democratization patterns and 
socio-political fragmentation 
even when controlling for time 
effects and other country 
predictors. 
 
The analysis of electoral 
geography in fifteen countries in 
                                       
47
 Jones, M. P. and S. Mainwaring. Op. Cit. 
139-166. 
Latin America reveals 
remarkable, inter- and intra-
country differences in terms of 
geographic distribution of the 
parties’ vote. Like Meleshevich 
suggests, although some parties 
manifest a tendency towards a 
greater regional uniformity of 
party support, the pace of this 
trend is different in different 
nations as well as it is in 
different parties48. The findings 
presented in this document 
shed new light on patterns of 
electoral support in legislative 
elections in Latin America, using 
disaggregated electoral returns. 
My analysis of 104 
parliamentary elections, 326 
electoral districts, and 46 
political parties during the years 
1950-2010 show interesting, 
inter- and intra-country 
variations in patterns of 
partisan support over time. This 
work makes clear that party 
nationalization score varies 
markedly across countries and 
among parties.  
This document 
contributes to reduce a gap in 
the specialized literature. 
Scholars on party 
nationalization that focus on 
Latin America has taken for 
granted two factors. First, in 
both pre and post-
democratization civil conflicts 
predominate in the region. As a 
result, one might expect that 
armed conflicts influence 
parties’ performance in the 
territory. Secondly, despite 
countries democratize relatively 
at the same time (1980s and 
1990s), democratization 
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pathways vary considerably 
among countries. Here, I 
provide evidence that “bouncy” 
nations, meaning those cases 
that show a back and forth 
between democracy and 
authoritarian regimes, have less 
nationalized political parties. In 
short, examining Latin American 
cases also help to test old and 
new hypothesis regarding this 
salient issue. This document 
complements other analyses of 
parties’ nationalization patterns 
by examining district-by-district 
changes across parties and 
among countries.  
 
This paper also 
contributes to understand a 
crucial topic: the role that 
political parties play under new 
democratic circumstances. In 
Latin American cases, in spite of 
the fact that some political 
parties share similar 
backgrounds and paths, parties 
vary remarkably across nations 
as well as their do in 
nationalization support patterns. 
Lastly, I certainly believe that 
this document and my findings 
constitute an important step 
forward to party nationalization 
academic research.               
 
Notes: 
iIn terms of Caramani, the 
formation of national electorates 
and party systems is not only a 
crucial aspect of the 
construction of national political 
space and of the structuring of 
party systems, but also of the 
development of a political 
democratic citizenship. In 
Western Europe, “the 
nationalization of electoral 
alignments and political parties 
has meant the transition from a 
fragmented and clientelistic 
type of politics dominated by 
local political personalities to 
national representation. 
National party organizations 
structured along nationwide 
cleavages replaced an atomized 
type of political representation” 
Caramani, D. The 
nationalization of politics : the 
formation of national electorates 
and party systems in Western 
Europe. Cambridge, UK ; New 
York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004. 
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